SAUL
A. KRIPKE We call the resulting system S5*=; if equality is omitted, we call it S5*, and if quantifiers and equality are dropped, we call it S5.
Given a non-empty domain D and a formula A, we define a complete assignment for A in D as a /unction which to every free individual variable of A assigns an element of D, to every propositional variable of A assigns either T or F. and to every n-adic predicate variable of A assigns a set of ordered n-tuples of members of D. We define a model of A in D as an ordered pair (G, K), where G is a complete assignment for A in D and K is a set of complete assignments for A in D such that G E K and such that every member of K agrees with G in its assignments for free individual variables of A (but not necessarily in its assignments for propositional and predicate variables of A). Let H be a member of K and B a subformula of A; we define H as assigning either T or F to B inductively, thus: If B is an n-adic prime formula P(xl, . . ., x"), and if V is th ordered n-tuples H assigns to P, and we assign elements of D ocl, . . , an to xl, .. ., xn (the assignment must be consistent with H, but if some x.
is bound in A and hence not assigned an element, we make an arbitrary assignment), then B is assigned T if (oa., . .., OIa) E Vp; otherw 
JOB is assigned T(F) if and only if B is assigned F(T). B A C is assigned T if B and C are both assigned T; otherwise it is assigned F. (x)B(x) is assigned T if B(x) is assigned
T for every assignment of an element of D to x; otherwise, it is assigned F.
LiB is assigned T if every member of K assigns T to B (subject to the stipulation that all members of K agree in their assignments to all free individual variables of B); otherwise, it is assigned F.
A is said to be valid in a model (G, The basis of the informal analysis which motivated these definitions is that a proposition is necessary if and only if it is true in all "possible worlds."
(It is not necessary for our present purposes to analyze the concept of a "possible world" any further.) Now let A be a formula with P1, ..., Pm as its propositional and predicate variables and xi,..., xn as its individual variables. If we interpret every free individual variable as denoting a particular object and every propositional or predicate variable as denoting a particular proposition or predicate, then A becomes a "proposition" in the ordinary sense of the word. From an extensional point of view, an adequate semantic counterpart to this interpretation is given by the concept of a complete assignment for A in a domain D. In modal logic, however, we wish to know not only about the real world but about other conceivable worlds; P may be true in the real world but false in some imaginable one, and similarly for P(xl, ..., xn). Thus we are led not to a single assignment but to a set K of assignments, all but one of which represent worlds which are conceivable but not actual; the assignment representing the actual world is singled out as G, and the pair (G, K) is said to form a model of A. Furthermore, since xl, ... , xn represent individual objects, which remain the same in all worlds, we assume that all members of K agree in their assignments to individual variables. Clearly all the rules for assigning T or F to formulas now become valid when they are interpreted as representing an evaluation of the proposition corresponding to the formula as true or false in a given "world," whether real or possible. In particular, a proposition EB is evaluated as true when and only when B holds in all conceivable worlds. A proposition can be said to be true if it holds in the actual world; this idea leads to our definition of validity in a model. In trying to construct a definition of universal logical validity, it seems plausible to assume not only that the universe of discourse may contain an arbitrary number of elements and that predicates may be assigned any given interpretations in the actual world, but also that any combination of possible worlds may be associated with the real world with respect to some group of predicates. In other words, it is plausible to assume that no further restrictions need be placed on D, G, and K, except the standard one that D be non-empty. This assumption leads directly to our definition of universal validity.
It is noteworthy that the theorems of this paper can be formalized in a metalanguage (such as Zermelo set theory) which is "extensional," both in the sense of possessing set-theoretic axioms of extensionality and in the sense of postulating no sentential connectives other than the truth-functions.
Thus it is seen that at least a certain non-trivial portion of the semantics of modality is available to an extensionalist logician.
We shall now turn to our completeness proof. We base it on the concept of semantic tableaux introduced by Beth [4] . The present treatment is self-contained, although acquaintance with Beth's paper may facilitate comprehension.
We say that a formula B is semantically entailed by formulas A, A2, In addition to these rules for construction of semantic tableaux, we add that if no free variable appears and none is introduced under fir, then we introduce a free variable so that Ill can be applicable. 3 The names of these rules were suggested by those for the inferential rules of
Curry [8] .
This Finally, our stipulation that at least one free variable should be introduced corresponds to the restriction that D be non-empty.
Since the construction is closed, every alternative set contains a tableau which either has a formula irl both columns or has a=.a on the right. This, however, means that some member of K must either assign both T and F to some formula or must assign F to a a. Since our valuation rules make both of these alternatives impossible, it follows that the domain D and T if it appears on the left in the tableau; otherwise it is assigned F. A predicate variable Pn is assigned the set of all ordered n-tuples (xl, ..., x"*) such that Pn(x1, . .. , xn) appears on the left of the tableau. We now have a set K of complete assignments corresponding to our set of tableaux;
if G is the assignment corresponding to the main tableau of the set, (G (3a.,) . . . (3a,) (a,= a, A D A 0 (E A a, a,,) ). D .(3a,) . . . (3ar) ... (3a,) ... PROOF. Since A is universally valid, by Theorem I the tableau construction beginning with A in a right column is closed. Let B be the characteristic formula of the earliest stage at which the closure is provable (i.e., the earliest stage at which every alternative set contains a tableau with either a formula in both columns or a formula a a on the right). Thus far, we have not permitted quantification on propositional variables.
D A -.(A A B) A -.B. Hence we have F0 (D A (A A B)). D .0 (D A (A A B) A -A. v. D A -(A A B) A -.B). By a well-known theorem of S5, we have F0 (D A (A A B) A -A. v. D A -(A A B) A -,B). D .K (D A (A
We now define a system S5 with propositional quantifiers, containing propositional quantifiers and the following axiom schemes (besides those of S5): (4) (P)A (P) v A (Q), subject to the usual restrictions on substitution.
(5) (P) (A (P) d) B (P)). =) .(P) A(P) D) (P) B(P).
(6) A v (P)A, if P is not free in A. Some of these systems, alternative to S5*=, lead to alternative notions of completeness; and any comparison of them for "acceptability" can be based on an examination of these alternative semantical notions. The details of such considerations will appear in a sequel to the present paper. variables. In such a system we let all formulas of the form (7), with the existential quantifiers replaced by a single negation sign, be postulated as directly refutable (see [3] ). Then the resulting system is complete, in the sense that every formula is either provable or refutable; hence if we add an unprovable formula to the system, we obtain inconsistency in the sense of [3] .
